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TORTS-NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS
One of the most rapidly growing phases of the law is the tort
action which has been allowed in many cases where there is inter-
ference with contractual and advantageous relationships. The
chief purpose of this note is to examine the applications to negli-
gent interference with contracts, with appropriate references to
analogous relationships.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
It will be useful to trace briefly this development with respect
both to intentional and to negligent interferences.
Historically a contract affected only the parties to it., Later,
rights from assignments came to be protected, then the third party
beneficiary came to be looked upon favorably. Meantime interference
with family relations, such as that of master and servant, became
actionable. In a similar way the Roman law allowed the pater-
familias to recover where violence or insults had been inflicted upon
his family or slaves, on the ground that the injury was one to him-
self.2 The same principle was applied in thirteenth century England
when a master recovered for forcible interference with his servant.'
The shortage of labor following the Black Death gave birth to the
Ordinance of Labourers of 1349 which granted the master a remedy
against any person who enticed away his servants although without
violence or force.4 As the element of family status faded out, rela-
tions of contract came into the picture; and following them, inter-
ference with advantageous relations, with some exceptions, became
actionable.
In the early cases, there was liability for negligent action which
interfered with performance of services to the master by the servant.
Thus in 1614, in Evarard v. Hopkins,' a physician who treated a
servant in a negligent manner was held to be liable for the amount
which represented the master's loss of services. It should be noted
'Tweddle v Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393, 121 Eng. Rep. R. 762
(Q. B. 1861) Penson and Higbed's Case, 4 Leon. 99, 74 Eng. Rep. R.
756 (K. B. 1589)
'PRossER, TORTS (1941) 976. In fact, the origin was even older
than the Roman law for the Athenians allowed the master an action
against one who beat or mistreated his servants. 3 BL. COMM. *142.
PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 976.
S23 EDW III, Stat. 1. It was enforced under the Statute of
Labourers, 1350, 25 EDW III, Stat. 1. The effect of these statutes is
mentioned by PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 977, and in the article, Car-
penter, Interference with Contract Relations (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV.
728; 729.
2 Bulstrode 332, 80 Eng. Rep. R. 1164 (K. B. 1614)
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that the emphasis of the law was slowly changing from the status of
master and servant to the contract of employment itself.G In 1840,
Hodsoll v. Stallebras reached the same result as the Evarard case
when the negligence consisted of the keeping of a vicious dog which
bit and injured the servant.
At first, liability for interference, whether willful or negligent,
was confined to cases where the master-servant relationship existed
and was not extended to include actions by the employer for in-
juries done to his employees. For instance, in Taylor v. Ner,8 the
plaintiff, who was the manager of a theatre, engaged B to sing dur-
ing the season at a named salary The defendant assaulted B and so
injured him that he was not able to perform his part of the contract.
The court held that B was not a servant but was an employee, and
stated that " if the present action could be supported, every man,
whose servant, whether domestic or not, was kept away a day from
his business, could maintain an action."9 Thus the harm was recog-
nized, but the remedy asked was without precedent and the court
feared to tread upon strange ground.
So the important case of Lumley v. Gye," decided in 1853, be-
came a milestone in the law The defendant was held to be liable
in a tort action for having maliciously induced a singer not to per-
form her contract with the plaintiff. In the majority opimon of the
court Crompton, J. stated that " the principle of the action for
enticing away servants [applies] to a case where the defendant
maliciously procures a party, who is under a valid contract to give
her exclusive personal services to the plaintiff for a specified period,
to refuse to give such services during the period for which she had
so contracted, whereby the plaintiff was injured."'
II. NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE.
In the law today it is not necessary that the parties occupy the
relationship of master and servant, since the contract itself is the
object of protection.' The prevailing rule is that where a third party
OMAINE, ANCIENT LAW (6th ed. 1876) 170.
11 A. & E. 301, 113 Eng. Rep. R. 429 (Q. B. 1840)
81 Espinasse 386, 170 Eng. Rep. R. 393 (C. P 1795)
OId. at 386, 170 Eng. Rep. R. at 394.
2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. R. 749 (Q. B. 1853)
"Id. at 231, 118 Eng. Rep. R. 755.
"The law has thus extended its protection beyond the status or
relationship of master and servant, and later of employer and em-
ployee, to the contractual relation. All types of contracts, and not
merely those involving personal services as in Lumley v. Gye are
included within this protection. Temperton v Russell, (1893) 1 Q.
B. 715.
Another distinction between the case of Lumley v. Gye and the
present-day law should be made. In that case "malice" meant actual
ill will, but now it is sufficient to say that the term means "the in-
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brings about a breach of the contract by means of inducement or
intentional interference with performance by one of the parties,
such person is liable to the other party to the contract to the extent
of the damage which he has caused.' It should be noted that there
is no liability to a third person for either intentional or negligent
action against a party to a contract which disables him from per-
forming unless the interferer has knowledge of the contractual re-
lation or has reason to believe that it exists. '
We should next inquire as to the feasibility of extending liabil-
ity to cases where there is negligent interference with the perform-
ance of the contract. Very few courts have expressly recognized any
legal remedy in such cases, although many of the cases allowing re-
covery for intentional interference state the rule in language which
is sufficiently broad to include liability for negligence. Thus the
recent Illinois decision in Krauter v. Adler states that "A party to a
contract has a property right therein, and any injury thereto
amounts to a tort for which [the] injured party may claim compen-
sation by an action in tort for damages."' The reasons most com-
monly given for denying liability for negligent interference are re-
moteness of causation and the placing of an undue burden on inter-
tentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification or ex-
cuse." Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v Diamond State Fibre
Co., 268 Fed. 121, 127 (D. Del. 1920) see Campbell v Gates, 236
N. Y. 457, 460, 141 N. E. 914, 915 (1923), South Wales Miners' Fed-
eration v. Glamorgan Coal Co., (1905) A. C. 239, 255.
' Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 207 U. S. 205
(1907), Hornstem v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930),
Temperton v. Russell, (1893) 1 Q. B. 715.
14 For example, one having a contract with a town for the sup-
port of its paupers can not maintain an action against a person who
assaults and beats one of the paupers. Anthony v. Slaid, 52 Mass.
(11 Metc.) 290 (1846) cited in The Federal No. 2, 21 F 2d. 313, 314
(C. C. A. 2d. 1926) accord: Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v United
States, 153 F 2d. 958 (C. C. A. 9th, 1946)
The rule that a master can recover for injuries inflicted upon
his servant is the exception. See Evarard v Hopkins and Hodsoll v.
Stallebrass which appear in the text. A municipality recovered dam-
ages for injuries to a policeman in Bradford v Webster (1920) 2 K.
B. 135; and a master recovered for injuries inflicted upon his appren-
tice in Ames v. Union Ry., 117 Mass. 541 (1875).
As it has been stated in the text the emphasis in many cases has
shifted from the relationship of master and servant to the contractual
relation. In Bradford v. Webster (1920) 2 K. B. 135, the court used
the term "servant" (id. at 144) and also spoke of the contract (id. at
143).14 328 Ill. App. 127, 65 N. E. 2d 215 (1946). The question before
the court, however, was whether or not a broker who had been
.deprived of his commissions for which he had contracted with a cor-
poration, could recover damages against the defendants who had
conspired to dissolve the corporation and thereby to stqp the pay-
ment of the commissions. The plaintiff was held to have stated a
cause of action in tort.
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ferers." It is thought that liability might lead to disastrous conse-
quences in the daily affairs of life.
Are there any cases or authorities which recognize a cause of
action against a third person for negligent interference with con-
tractual interests? The reader will note that there are several types
of interests. For example, A and B may have a contract with which
C, not a party to any contract, negligently interferes. Or when A and
B are bound by a contract, C may also have a contract with one of
parties which he (C) performs negligently so as to cause damage to
one or both of the parties to the first contract. Then again, one of
the parties to a contract may perform it negligently so that a third
party is injured, as in the telegraph cases to be considered later in
this note.
A. SUITS WHERE THIRD PERSONS ARE INVOLVED.
In an American case, The Aquitania (1920)7 a collision occurred
between the defendant's ship and one which had been chartered by
the plaintiffs. Damages for the property loss and for the loss of use
while the ship was being repaired were recovered by the charterers.
Without speaking of actual knowledge of the contract, the court said:
"When the ship starts on her voyage, the insurance which the time
charterer should have is that a court of justice will see to it that a
wrong which deprives him of his use under his charter will be ap-
propriately redressed."'8 This is strong language indeed. The court
also treated the charterer's interest in the vessel as a property right,
and it was pointed out that the term "property" is not limited to
tangibles but may include franchises, rights of action, and even
contractual interests. There is no adequate reason, however, to re-
duce the interest to a property right.
B. SUITS BY THE OWNER OF PROPERTY.
In The Argentino,' an English case decided in 1889, a ship of
that name collided with another vessel because of negligence on the
part of the operators of both ships. The owners of the Argentino
sustained loss because they were unable to fulfill the terms of a
contract to be performed in the future but entered into prior to the
2 Remoteness of causation is the reason given in The Federal
No. 2, 21 F 2d 313 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927). A writer in the Note (1935)
23 CALIF. L. REV. 420, 421, states that the courts are trying to ex-
press in vague terms of causation that the law denies responsibility
to third persons because of the fear of an undue burden. Professor
Prosser also believes that the fear of an undue burden is one of the
reasons. PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 993.
27 270 Fed. 239 (S. D. N. Y. 1920) accord: Hines v. Sangstad S.
S. Co., 266 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 1st, .1920).
" Id. at 245.
'14 App. Cas. 519 (1889).
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collision. In allowing the owners (and not the charterers, as in
The Aquitarna) recovery for the loss of earnings which would have
been derived from the employment contracted for, Lord Herschell
stated in his opinion:
"I think that damages which flow directly and
naturally or in the ordinary course of things, from the
wrongful act, cannot be regarded as too remote. The loss
of the use of a vessel and of the earnings which would
ordinarily be derived from its use during the time it is
under repair, and therefore not available for trading
purposes, is certainly damage which directly and
naturally flows from a collision."
By that language the English Admiralty court is shown not to
have been influenced by the fear of extending liability unduly to
extremes of remoteness. It is important to keep in mind that no men-
tion is made of knowledge of the plaintiff's contract; and that fact
will be considered shortly Both The Aquitansa and The Argentino
were cases in admiralty
In the very recent case of The Aurora," the facts are similar to
those of The Argentino. The motor boat Karankawa was regularly
engaged in hauling shrimp for a wholesale firm in Louisiana. The
negligence of the defendant in causing a collision resulted in damage
to the boat and loss of use for fifteen days. The owner of the
Karankawa recovered from the owner of the Aurora the cost of re-
pairs and the loss of use. The Argentino and The Aurora are alike in
that the owners rather than the charterers brought suit, but in both
cases the amounts representing the loss of profits under the con-
tracts were allowed by the courts. The principle involved in all three
of these cases is the same concerning damages, namely, that the
owner (in the cases of The Argentino and The Aurora) and the time
charterer (in The Aquitanza) could recover the loss of profits under
contracts of which the negligent party had no specific knowledge of
the employment but could reasonably have been expected to know
that such contracts existed.
C. SUITS BETWEEN PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT.
In relation to the two cases in which the owner recovered dam-
ages for the loss of profits of which the wrongdoer did not specifi-
cally know the case of Hadley v. Baxendale2 may be helpful. The
plaintiffs were the owners of a flour mill. They sent a broken engine
shaft to the office of the defendants, who were common carriers, for
the purpose of shipment. The clerk of the defendants was told that
" Id. at 523.
2'64 F Supp. 502 (E. D. La. 1945) affirmed, Loje v Protich,
153 F 2d 224 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946).
-9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. R. 145 (1854)
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the mill was stopped and that if necessary a special entry should be
be made to hasten delivery of the shaft. Delivery to the consignee
was delayed for an unreasonable time, and consequently the plain-
tiffs incurred a loss of profits. The Court of Exchequer denied re-
covery for the plaintiff on the ground that the defendants had no
knowledge of the special circumstances involved in the case. How-
ever, the court stated the principle that when a party to a contract
breaches it, the damages which the other party should receive are
" such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the con-
templation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as
the probable result of the breach of it."' It would seem to be a
sound modern principle that where one of the parties hinders the
performance of the contract so that the other party is damaged in
his relations with third parties, the growing demands of the law
will make restitution for the damage. The party who breaches the
contract owes a duty to third persons whose interests will be affected
thereby
III. THE ROBINS CASE.
Following The Aquitanza came the leading American case which
denied liability for negligence. In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.
Flint,' a case in admiralty, the contract between the owner and the
charterers provided that the vessel was to be docked for repairs
every six months. In pursuance of that arrangement the ship was de-
livered to the yards of the defendant and while it was there the
propeller was damaged through negligence. A delay resulted which
deprived the charterers of the use of the ship. The defendant had no
specific notice of the charter party until the delay had already be-
gun. The charterers reached a settlement with the owner and then
sought to recover from the defendant such damages as resulted from
the loss of use of the vessel. In denying recovery the majority opin-
ion written by Mr. Justice Holmes stated that " as a general rule,
at least, a tort to the person or property of one man does not make
the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person
was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the
wrong."'
There is a diversity of opinion concerning the Robins case. It is
believed by Professor Carpenter that there was no negligence
toward the plaintiff at all and that the case should not be cited as
denying liability where there is negligent interference. -' As the facts
show, the defendant did not have knowledge of the contract until
Id. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. R. at 151.
2'275 U. S. 303 (1927).
'Id. at 309.
1Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations (1928) 41
HARV. L. REv. 728, 740.
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after the loss had ensued. Therefore it is arguable that having no
such notice, it was not negligent as respects the plaintiff. Another
writer in the Columbia Law Review seems to adhere to the view
that interference with the contract must be done intentionally or
with knowledge that loss may result. It is said there that " there
was nothing to show that the defendant was aware or should have
been aware at the time of the act complained of, that the plaintiff
was concerned in the contract of repair."'
It is submitted, however, that there was negligence in the
Robins case; that, although the defendant did not know of the
specific contract at the time when the delay began, it should reason-
ably have anticipated that the vessel was being operated by some
one other than the owner who would expect to make profits from
the operation and who therefore has been harmed by the negligent
performance of the contract. In the case of Twitchell v. Nelson, the
court found that there was substantially an intent to interfere with
a contract on this ground: "From a knowledge of such facts the law
imposes the duty to inquire, and the failure to do so, either willfully
or negligently, constitutes bad faith and the legal inference of actual
knowledge is conclusive. ' 28 The owner of the dry dock m the Robins
case doubtless knew that ships were needed as soon as possible after
repair in order to carry on commerce. It would seem reasonable to
say that it knew, as the court stated in The Argentino, that " a
ship is a thing by the use of which money may be ordinarily
earned, "- Having knowledge, then, that the ship was likely to
be under contract, the defendant should have used reasonable care
with regard to that contractual interest, and failing to do so, should
have been held to be liable. If the Minnesota court in the Twitchefl
case was able to find an intention to interfere because of circum-
stances of which the wrongdoer should have taken notice, a fortiori,
the Supreme Court could have discovered negligence on the part of
the defendant in the Robins case.
The view that the wrongdoer may be held to be liable for negli-
gent interference with a contract right when he has reason to be-
lieve that harm to a third person will result, could well have been
applied to cases which have not allowed recovery For example, in
the case of Byrd v. English," A owned a printing concern which re-
quired large amounts of electricity in order to operate. The power
was furnished to the plant by means of underground conduits. The
zNote (1928) 28 CoL. L. REV. 496, 497.
1131 Minn. 375, 155 N. W 621, 624 (1915). In that case the de-
fendant caused the plaintiff to be deprived of her rights under a
lease and was said to have done so with implied malice.
13 P D. 191, 201 (1888) This statement appeared in the case
when it was before the lower court and before it was appealed to
the House of Lords and affirmed in 14 App. Cas. 519 (1889).
"'117 Ga. 13, 43 S. E. 419 (1903).
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defendants were constructing a building on the same street. Work-
men excavated dirt in a negligent manner so that a wall of earth fell
on the conduits and broke the wires. A was thereby deprived of
power and suffered losses on contracts for printing jobs. The court
did not decide in favor of A because of the familiar rule as to negli-
gent interference, but it stated that the damage to the conduits might
reasonably have been anticipated. It seems clear that harm to the
plaintiff was foreseeable, or to some one who depended upon this
power to operate a business.
IV BASIS OF LIABILITY.
When there are no facts which should place the third party on
notice, there should be no liability. For instance, m Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. New York & N. H. R. R. Co.,. an in-
surance company was not allowed to recover in tort from the rail-
road which negligently caused the death of the insured. Presumably
the court thought that the railroad in performing its contracts negli-
gently was not required to anticipate that its wrongful act would
cause harm to an insurance company which had insured the life of
the promisee. It was held in Brink v. Wabash R. Co. " that parents
whose son was killed because of the company's negligence could not
collect as damages the prospective amount due under a contract for
support. In both cases the harm was not reasonably foreseeable."
The establishment of the tort for negligent interference with
contractual relationships which seemed to be under way in The
Aquiltania is in keeping with similar and analogous applications of
law. Public weighers have been held to be liable to their customers
for the negligent weighing of beans when they knew that the pur-
pose of the weighing was to determine the price that the buyer
should pay.' This is a sound result; for suppose that the buyer had
relied on the weighing, paid a higher price than he would have paid
otherwise, and can not get it back because of the insolvency of the
seller. A tort action should be allowed because of the foreseeability
involved; emphasis in the case of the public weighers, however, was
placed upon the public character of their employment. Telegraph
companies have been subjected to liability to third persons for negli-
gent delay in the transmission of telegrams where such delay was
responsible for damage and where such damage was in the reason-
able contemplation of the parties.' In such cases, there are two con-
tracts involved: first, the contract between the sender and the tele-
125 Conn. 265 (1856).
160 Mo. 87, 60 S.W 1058 (1901).
'The reader is referred to the brief discussion in note 14 supra.
Glanzer v Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922)
'Jolley v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 204 N. C. 136, 167 S. E.
575 (1933), Note (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 759, 760.
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graph company- and secondly the existing or prospective contract
between the sender and the addressee. The facts of the Robzns case
are similar, for the charterer who had a contract with the owner
recovered from the defendant who negligently performed a second
contract with the owner. In the telegraph cases the dictum of
Hadley v. Baxendale applies by restricting liability to such damage
as was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time
of the formation of the contract. Of course, a public utility is in-
volved in the case of a telegraph company* and liabilities are often
imposed on such utilities which private corporations do not bear.
Tort liability has been extended to the violation of expectancies
under wills' although it has not clearly been applied in negligence
cases. This may take the form of an action for damages for frustra-
tion of the execution,8 suppression and forgery,-" or alteration4 of a
will. Kentucky permits recovery where fraudulent interference
causes a change of the beneficiary of an insurance policy.' The
above examples would seem to be much stronger than the contract
cases since in the wills and insurance cases there is no contractual
relation, which is usually certain and formal; but there is only a
strong possibility or a probability that benefit will be received by
the plaintiff.
It is submitted that the arguments are sufficient to justify the
general approval of a remedy in tort for negligence which interferes
with the rights of third persons, given proximate cause and reason-
able grounds for anticipating the harm. Many cases hold that it gives
rise to a property right. It logically follows that since there may be
recovery for torts which are committed intentionally or negligently
against other types of property recovery should be similarly ex-
tended to contracts. If the property element is left out, however, Ps
Mr. Justice Holmes thought best 2 and if the attention of the courts
is focused upon the third party's contract, the result should depend
upon the foreseeability of harm.
E. DURWARD WELDON
An English case which follows the dictum of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale is Cointat v Myham & Son, (1913) 2 K. B. 220. Hadley v Bax-
endale is cited at 222 along with The Argentino.
" Interference with wills is covered by the article by Dean
Evans, Torts to Expectancies in Decedents' Estates (1944) 93 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 187.
' Bohannon v Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 210 N. C. 679, 188
S. E. 390 (1936) see Lewis v Corbm, 195 Mass. 520, 81 N. E. 248,
249-250 (1907)
Morton v Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N. E. 591 (1931).
Dulin v Bailey 172 N. C. 608, 90 S. E. 689 (1916).
Daugherty v Daugherty, 152 Ky 732, 154 S. W 9 (1913).
• Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v Flint, 275 U. S. 303, 308
(1927)
